HB941 - Relating to the resilience of the electric grid and certain municipalities.

  89R1144 CXP-F     By: Cain H.B. No. 941       A BILL TO BE ENTITLED   AN ACT   relating to the resilience of the electric grid and certain   municipalities.          BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:          SECTION 1.  The legislature finds that:                (1)  electric grid outages threaten the lives of the   citizens of this state and pose a disproportionately large risk to:                      (A)  the elderly, vulnerable, and underprivileged   within this state; and                      (B)  communities facing disproportionate   environmental health burdens and population vulnerabilities   relating to facilities such as chemical plants and refineries that   can become environmental disaster areas when taken off-line due to   loss of electricity;                (2)  the 16 critical infrastructure sectors identified   in President Barack Obama's Presidential Policy Directive   "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience" (PPD-21)   (chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical   manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services,   energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government   facilities, healthcare and public health, information technology,   nuclear reactors, materials, and waste, transportation systems,   water and wastewater systems) depend on the electric grid in this   state and make the grid's protection vital to the economy of this   nation and homeland security;                (3)  the power outage that occurred in this state in   February 2021 caused:                      (A)  death and suffering in this state;                      (B)  economic loss to this state's economy;                      (C)  impacts to all critical infrastructures in   this state;                      (D)  the dispatch of generation units that likely   exceeded limits established by the Environmental Protection Agency   for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury, and carbon monoxide   emissions and wastewater release limits;                      (E)  radically increased pricing of electricity   and made electric power bills unaffordable to many customers across   this state; and                      (F)  exacerbation of COVID-19 pandemic risk by   forcing many of the state's citizens to consolidate at warming   centers and in other small spaces where warmth for survival   superseded social distancing protocols;                (4)  a previous large-scale power outage occurred in   this state in February 2011 during which 4.4 million customers were   affected;                (5)  this state is uniquely positioned to prevent power   outages because this state is a net exporter of energy and is the   only state with an electric grid almost exclusively within its   territorial boundaries;                (6)  the 2011 and 2021 power outages call into   question:                      (A)  whether too much risk has been accepted   regarding weatherization of electric generation infrastructure;                      (B)  whether this state lacks the internal   distribution structure and control systems to manage rolling   outages; and                      (C)  whether sufficient resources have been   allocated toward overall grid resilience;                (7)  public confidence in the resilience of the   electric grid in this state is essential to ensuring economic   prosperity, domestic tranquility, continuity of government, and   life-sustaining systems;                (8)  a resilient electric grid that offers businesses   in this state continuity of operations in the event of a natural or   man-made disaster will be an unrivaled attraction for businesses to   expand or move their operations to this state;                (9)  a resilient electric grid that can operate in the   event of a natural or man-made disaster will protect important   facets of this state, including its military installations and   environment;                (10)  current market incentives and regulations are not   sufficient for electric utilities to:                      (A)  prioritize grid security and resilience; and                      (B)  protect the grid against hazards;                (11)  protection of the electric grid in this state   against hazards would assure businesses and the citizens of this   state that the "lights will be back on first in Texas" in the event   of a nationwide catastrophe affecting electric infrastructure,   sparing this state from catastrophic societal and environmental   consequences; and                (12)  when this state begins implementation of the plan   for all hazards resilience described by Section 44.007, Utilities   Code, as added by this Act, to protect the electric grid in this   state, short-term and long-term economic benefits will far exceed   even the most optimistic estimates of the conventional economic   incentives provided by tax abatements to attract businesses to this   state.          SECTION 2.  Subtitle B, Title 2, Utilities Code, is amended   by adding Chapter 44 to read as follows:   CHAPTER 44. GRID RESILIENCE           Sec. 44.001.  DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:                 (1)  "All hazards" means:                       (A)     terrestrial weather including wind,   hurricanes, tornadoes, flooding, ice storms, extended cold weather   events, heat waves, and wildfires;                       (B)     seismic events including earthquakes and   tsunamis;                       (C)     physical threats including terrorist attacks   with direct fire, drones, explosives, and other methods of physical   sabotage;                       (D)     cyber attacks including malware attacks and   hacking of unprotected or compromised information technology   networks;                       (E)     manipulation of operational technology   devices including sensors, actuators, and drives;                       (F)     electromagnetic threats through man-made   radio frequency weapons, high-altitude nuclear electromagnetic   pulses, and naturally occurring geomagnetic disturbances;                       (G)     electric generation supply chain   vulnerabilities including insecure or inadequate fuel   transportation or storage; and                       (H)     insider threats caused by compromised or   hostile personnel working within government or the utility   industry.                 (2)     "Micro-grid" means a group of interconnected loads   and distributed energy resources inside clearly defined electrical   boundaries.                 (3)     "Security commission" means the Texas Grid   Security Commission.           Sec.   44.002.     TEXAS GRID SECURITY COMMISSION. (a) The Texas   Grid Security Commission is composed of the following members:                 (1)     a representative of the Texas Division of   Emergency Management appointed by the chief of that division;                 (2)     a representative of the commission appointed by   that commission;                 (3)     a representative of the Railroad Commission of   Texas appointed by that commission;                 (4)     a representative of the independent organization   certified under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT power region appointed   by the chief executive officer of that organization;                 (5)     a representative of power generation companies   appointed by the chief of the Texas Division of Emergency   Management; and                 (6)     a representative of transmission and distribution   utilities appointed by the chief of the Texas Division of Emergency   Management.           (b)     The Texas Division of Emergency Management shall   designate a member of the security commission to serve as presiding   officer.           (c)     The security commission shall convene at the call of the   presiding officer.           (d)     The security commission shall report to the chief of the   Texas Division of Emergency Management.           (e)     A vacancy on the security commission is filled by   appointment for the unexpired term in the same manner as the   original appointment.           (f)     To the extent possible, individuals appointed to the   security commission must be residents of this state.           (g)     The chief of the Texas Division of Emergency Management   may invite officials or former officials of the United States   Department of Defense or Department of Homeland Security with   expertise on electromagnetic pulse defense to advise the security   commission.           (h)     The presiding officer of the security commission or the   chief of the Texas Division of Emergency Management may invite to   advise the security commission any person whose expertise the   security commission considers necessary to carry out the purposes   of this chapter, including individuals recognized as experts in the   fields of law enforcement, emergency services, communications,   water and sewer services, health care, financial services,   agriculture, transportation, electricity markets, cybersecurity of   grid control systems, electromagnetic pulse mitigation,   terrestrial and solar weather, and micro-grids.           Sec.   44.003.     GRID RESILIENCE INFORMATION. (a)   Each of the   following members of the security commission shall apply for a   secret security clearance or an interim secret security clearance   to be granted by the federal government:                 (1)     the representative of the independent   organization certified under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT power   region;                [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]