SB734 - Criminal procedure: discrimination.

Senate Bill No. 734 CHAPTER 784 An act to add Section 3305.6 to the Government Code, and to amend Sections 745, 1473, 1473.7, and 13510.8 of the Penal Code, relating to criminal procedure. [ Approved by Governor October 13, 2025. Filed with Secretary of State October 13, 2025. ] LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST SB 734, Caballero. Criminal procedure: discrimination. Existing law, the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, grants certain employment rights to public safety officers, as defined. The act prohibits, among other things, any punitive action against a public safety officer, denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, or threat of such treatment, because of the lawful exercise of the rights granted under the act, or the exercise of any rights under any existing administrative grievance procedure. Existing law, the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, prohibits the state from seeking a criminal conviction or sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. Existing law authorizes a defendant to file a motion in the trial court or, if judgment has been imposed, to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus to allege a violation of this prohibition. Existing law authorizes the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training to revoke the certification of a peace officer if the officer has, while employed as a peace officer, engaged in serious misconduct including, among other things, demonstrating bias on the basis of race, national origin, religion, gender identity or expression, housing status, sexual orientation, mental or physical disability, or other protected status in violation of law or department policy or inconsistent with a peace officer’s obligation to carry out their duties in a fair and unbiased manner. This bill would prohibit a punitive action, denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, or a revocation of certification proceeding from being undertaken against any public safety officer on the basis of a court finding made in a challenge brought under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, and would prohibit those court findings from being introduced for any purpose in any administrative appeal of a punitive action. The bill would require, if the defendant is represented by an attorney in a case brought under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, in the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus, or in the filing of a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence based on a violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, and the motion or petition is based, in whole or in part, on the conduct of a law enforcement officer, the attorney to serve a copy of the motion on the law enforcement agency employing the officer. This bill would incorporate additional changes to Sections 745, 1473, and 1473.7 of the Penal Code proposed by AB 1071 to be operative only if this bill and AB 1071 are enacted and this bill is enacted last. Digest Key Vote: MAJORITY Appropriation: NO Fiscal Committee: YES Local Program: NO Bill Text The people of the State of California do enact as follows: SECTION 1. Section 3305.6 is added to the Government Code, to read: 3305.6. (a) A punitive action or denial of promotion on grounds other than merit shall not be undertaken by any public agency against any public safety officer because of a court finding made in a challenge brought pursuant to Section 745 of the Penal Code. (b) This section does not prohibit a public agency from taking punitive action, denying promotion on grounds other than merit, or taking other personnel action against a public safety officer based on the underlying acts or omissions which formed the basis of the action brought pursuant to Section 745 of the Penal Code, if the actions taken by the public agency otherwise conform to all the rules and procedures applicable to those proceedings, and the officer is accorded all due process protections provided in those proceedings. (c) Evidence of a court finding of a violation of Section 745 of the Penal Code shall not be introduced for any purpose in any administrative appeal of a punitive action. (d) This section does not grant immunity for civil or criminal liability for the underlying acts or omissions which formed the basis of the action brought under Section 745 of the Penal Code. SEC. 2. Section 745 of the Penal Code is amended to read: 745. (a) The state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. A violation is established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following: (1) The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin. (2) During the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful. This paragraph does not apply if the person speaking is relating language used by another that is relevant to the case or if the person speaking is giving a racially neutral and unbiased physical description of the suspect. (3) The defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained. (4) (A) A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed. (B) A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the same offense on defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or national origin than in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or national origins, in the county where the sentence was imposed. (b) A defendant may file a motion pursuant to this section, or a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7, in a court of competent jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a). For claims based on the trial record, a defendant may raise a claim alleging a violation of subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence. The defendant may also move to stay the appeal and request remand to the superior court to file a motion pursuant to this section. If the motion is based in whole or in part on conduct or statements by the judge, the judge shall disqualify themselves from any further proceedings under this section. (c) If a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a), the trial court shall hold a hearing. A motion made at trial shall be made as soon as practicable upon the defendant learning of the alleged violation. A motion that is not timely may be deemed waived, in the discretion of the court. (1) At the hearing, evidence may be presented by either party, including, but not limited to, statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony, and the sworn testimony of witnesses. The court may also appoint an independent expert. For the purpose of a motion and hearing under this section, out-of-court statements that the court finds trustworthy and reliable, statistical evidence, and aggregated data are admissible for the limited purpose of determining whether a violation of subdivision (a) has occurred. (2) The defendant shall have the burden of proving a violation of subdivision (a) by a preponderance of the evidence. The defendant does not need to prove intentional discrimination. (3) If the defendant is represented by an attorney and the motion alleges a violation of paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a), based in whole or in part on the conduct of one or more law enforcement officers, the attorney shall serve a copy of the motion on the law enforcement agency or agencies that employed the officer or officers. (4) At the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall make findings on the record. (d) A defendant may file a motion requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential violation of subdivision (a) in the possession or control of the state. A motion filed under this section shall describe the type of records or information the defendant seeks. Upon a showing of good cause, the court shall order the records to be released. Upon a showing of good cause, and in order to protect a privacy right or privilege, the court may permit the prosecution to redact information prior to disclosure or may subject disclosure to a protective order. If a statutory privilege or constitutional privacy right cannot be adequately protected by redaction or a protective order, the court shall not order the release of the records. (e) Notwithstanding any other law, except as provided in subdivision (k), or for an initiative approved by the voters, if the court finds, by a preponderance of evidence, a violation of subdivision (a), the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation found from the following list: (1) Before a judgment has been entered, the court may impose any of the following remedies: (A) Declare a mistrial, if requested by the defendant. (B) Discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury. (C) If the court determines that it would be in the interest of justice, dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or special allegations, or reduce one or more charges. (2) (A) After a judgment has been entered, if the court finds that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with subdivision (a). If the court finds that the only violation of subdivision (a) that occurred is based on paragraph (3) of subdivision (a), the court may modify the judgment to a lesser included or lesser related offense. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed. (B) After a judgment has been entered, if the court finds that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed. (3) When the court finds there has been a violation of subdivision (a), the defendant shall not be eligible for the death penalty. (4) The remedies available under this section do not foreclose any other remedies available under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, or any other law. (f) This section also applies to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile delinquency system and adjudications to transfer a juvenile case to adult court. (g) This section shall not prevent the prosecution of hate crimes pursuant to Sections 422.6 to 422.865, inclusive. (h) As used in this section, the following definitions apply: (1) “More frequently sought or obtained” or “more frequently imposed” means that the totality of the evidence demonstrates a significant difference in seeking or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing individuals who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated, and the prosecution cannot establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity. The evidence may include statistical evidence, aggregate data, or nonstatistical evidence. Statistical significance is a factor the court may consider, but is not necessary to establish a significant difference. In evaluating the totality of the evidence, the court shall consider whether systemic and institutional racial bias, racial profiling, and historical patterns of racially biased policing and prosecution may have contributed to, or caused differences observed in, the data or impacted the availability of data overall. Race-neutral reasons shall be relevant factors to charges, convictions, and sentences that are not influenced by implicit, systemic, or institutional bias based on race, ethnicity, or national origin. (2) “Prima facie showing” means that the defendant produces facts that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of subdivision (a) occurred. For purposes of this section, a “substantial likelihood” requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than not. (3) “Relevant factors,” as that phrase applies to sentencing, means the factors in the California Rules of Court that pertain to sentencing decisions and any additional factors required to or permitted to be considered in sentencing under state law and under the state and federal constitutions. (4) “Racially discriminatory language” means language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin. Evidence that particular words or images are used exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the defendant is of a specific race, ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to determining whether language is discriminatory. (5) “State” includes the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city prosecutor. (6) “Similarly situated” means that factors that are relevant in charging and sentencing are similar and do not require that all individuals in the comparison group are identical. A defendant’s conviction history may be a relevant factor to the severity of the charges, convictions, or sentences. If it is a relevant factor and the defense produces evidence that the conviction history may have been impacted by racial profiling or historical patterns of racially biased policing, the court shall consider the evidence. (i) A defendant may share a race, ethnicity, or national origin with more than one [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]