AB394 - Public transportation providers.

Assembly Bill No. 394 CHAPTER 147 An act to amend Section 527.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to amend Section 243.3 of the Penal Code, relating to public transportation. [ Approved by Governor October 01, 2025. Filed with Secretary of State October 01, 2025. ] LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST AB 394, Wilson. Public transportation providers. Existing law defines a battery as any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another. Existing law provides that when a battery is committed against the person of an operator, driver, or passenger on a bus, taxicab, streetcar, cable car, trackless trolley, or other motor vehicle, as specified, and the person who commits the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is engaged in the performance of their duties, the penalty is imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, a fine not exceeding $10,000, or both the fine and imprisonment. Existing law also provides that if the victim is injured, the offense would be punished by a fine not exceeding $10,000, by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year or in the state prison for 16 months, 2, or 3 years, or by both that fine and imprisonment. This bill would expand this crime to apply to an employee, public transportation provider, or contractor of a public transportation provider. By expanding the scope of an existing crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program. Existing law authorizes any employer or collective bargaining representative whose employee has suffered harassment, unlawful violence, or a credible threat of violence from any individual, which can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, to seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction on behalf of the employee and other employees of the employer. This bill would clarify that “unlawful violence” includes battery committed against the person of an operator, driver, or passenger on a bus, taxicab, streetcar, cable car, trackless trolley, or other motor vehicle, as specified, or against an employee, public transportation provider, or contractor of a public transportation provider. The bill would also clarify that the definition of “employer” for the above-described provision includes a joint powers authority or a public transit operator. The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement. This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason. Digest Key Vote: MAJORITY Appropriation: NO Fiscal Committee: YES Local Program: YES Bill Text The people of the State of California do enact as follows: SECTION 1. Section 527.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read: 527.8. (a) Any employer or collective bargaining representative of an employee who has suffered harassment, unlawful violence, or a credible threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer. For purposes of this section only, a person may bring a petition for a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of an employee as their collective bargaining representative only if the person serves as a collective bargaining representative for that employee in employment or labor matters at the employee’s workplace. (b) For purposes of this section: (1) “Course of conduct” is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an employee to or from the place of work; entering the workplace; following an employee during hours of employment; making telephone calls to an employee; or sending correspondence to an employee by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of the public or private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile, or computer email. (2) “Credible threat of violence” is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for their safety, or the safety of their immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose. (3) “Employer” and “employee” mean persons defined in Section 350 of the Labor Code. “Employer” also includes a federal agency, the state, a state agency, a city, county, or district, a joint powers authority, or a public transit operator, whether operated directly by a public entity or through a contract or subcontract, and a private, public, or quasi-public corporation, or any public agency thereof or therein. “Employee” also includes the members of boards of directors of private, public, and quasi-public corporations and elected and appointed public officers. For purposes of this section only, “employee” also includes a volunteer or independent contractor who performs services for the employer at the employer’s worksite. The changes made to this paragraph during the 2025–26 Regular Session are declaratory of existing law. (4) “Harassment” is a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress. (5) “Petitioner” means the employer or collective bargaining representative that petitions under subdivision (a) for a temporary restraining order and order after hearing. (6) “Respondent” means the person against whom the temporary restraining order and order after hearing are sought and, if the petition is granted, the restrained person. (7) “Temporary restraining order” and “order after hearing” mean orders that include any of the following restraining orders, whether issued ex parte or after notice and hearing: (A) An order enjoining a party from harassing, intimidating, molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, abusing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, or coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of, the employee. (B) An order enjoining a party from specified behavior that the court determines is necessary to effectuate orders described in subparagraph (A). (8) “Unlawful violence” is any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal Code, or any violation of Section 243.3 of the Penal Code, but shall not include lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others. The changes made to this paragraph during the 2025–26 Regular Session are declaratory of existing law. (c) This section does not permit a court to issue a temporary restraining order or order after hearing prohibiting speech or other activities that are constitutionally protected, protected by the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq.), protected by Chapter 11.5 (commencing with Section 3555) of Division 4 of Title 1 of the Government Code, or otherwise protected by Section 527.3 or any other provision of law. (d) In the discretion of the court, on a showing of good cause, a temporary restraining order or order after hearing issued under this section may include other named family or household members, or other persons employed at the employee’s workplace or workplaces. (e) Before filing a petition under this section, an employer or collective bargaining representative of an employee shall provide the employee who has suffered harassment, unlawful violence, or a credible threat of violence from any individual, an opportunity to decline to be named in the temporary restraining order. An employee’s request to not be named in the temporary restraining order shall not prohibit an employer or collective bargaining representative from seeking a temporary restraining order on behalf of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer. (f) (1) Upon filing a petition under this section, the petitioner may obtain a temporary restraining order in accordance with subdivision (a) of Section 527, if the petitioner also files a declaration that, to the satisfaction of the court, shows one of the following: (A) Reasonable proof that an employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence by the respondent, and that great or irreparable harm would result to an employee. (B) Clear and convincing evidence of all of the following: (i) That an employee has suffered harassment by the respondent. (ii) That great or irreparable harm would result to an employee. (iii) That the course of conduct at issue served no legitimate purpose. (iv) That the issuance of the order is not prohibited by subdivision (c). (2) The temporary restraining order may include any of the protective orders described in paragraph (7) of subdivision (b). (g) A request for the issuance of a temporary restraining order without notice under this section shall be granted or denied on the same day that the petition is submitted to the court, unless the petition is filed too late in the day to permit effective review, in which case the order shall be granted or denied on the next day of judicial business in sufficient time for the order to be filed that day with the clerk of the court. (h) A temporary restraining order granted under this section shall remain in effect, at the court’s discretion, for a period not to exceed 21 days, or if the court extends the time for hearing under subdivision (i), not to exceed 25 days, unless otherwise modified or terminated by the court. (i) Within 21 days, or if good cause appears to the court, 25 days from the date that a petition for a temporary order is granted or denied, a hearing shall be held on the petition. If no request for temporary orders is made, the hearing shall be held within 21 days, or, if good cause appears to the court, 25 days, from the date that the petition is filed. (j) The respondent may file a response that explains, excuses, justifies, or denies the alleged harassment, unlawful violence, or credible threats of violence. (k) At the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant and may make an independent inquiry. Moreover, if the respondent is currently employed by the employer of the employee, as described in subdivision (a), the judge shall receive evidence concerning the employer’s decision to retain, terminate, or otherwise discipline the respondent. If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in harassment, engaged in unlawful violence, or made a credible threat of violence, an order shall issue prohibiting further harassment, unlawful violence, or threats of violence. (l) (1) In the discretion of the court, an order issued after notice and hearing under this section may have a duration of not more than three years, subject to termination or modification by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party. These orders may be renewed, upon the request of a party, for a duration of not more than three years, without a showing of any further harassment, unlawful violence, or credible threats of violence since the issuance of the original order, subject to termination or modification by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party. The request for renewal may be brought at any time within the three months before the expiration of the order. (2) The failure to state the expiration date on the face of the form creates an order with a duration of three years from the date of issuance. (3) If an action is filed for the purpose of terminating or modifying a protective order prior to the expiration date specified in the order by a party other than the protected party, the party who is protected by the order shall be given notice, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1005, of the proceeding by personal service or, if the protected party has satisfied the requirements of Chapter 3.1 (commencing with Section 6205) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code, by service on the Secretary of State. If the party who is protected by the order cannot be notified prior to the hearing for modification or termination of the protective order, the court shall deny the motion to modify or terminate the order without prejudice or continue the hearing until the party who is protected can be properly noticed and may, upon a showing of good cause, specify another method for service of process that is reasonably designed to afford actual notice to the protected party. The protected party may waive their right to notice if they are physically present in court and does not challenge the sufficiency of the notice. (m) This section does not preclude any party from representation by private counsel or from appearing on the party’s own behalf. (n) Upon filing of a petition under this section, the respondent shall be personally served with a copy of the petition, temporary restraining order, if any, and notice of hearing of the petition. Service shall be made at least five days before the hearing. The court may, for good cause, on motion of the petitioner or on its own motion, shorten the time for service on the respondent. (o) A notice of hearing under this section shall notify the respondent that, if they do not attend the hearing, the court may make orders against them that could last up to three years. (p) The respondent shall be entitled, as a matter of course, to one continuance, for a reasonable period, to respond to the petition. (q) (1) Any party may request a continuance of the hearing, which the court shall grant on a showing of good cause. The request may be made in writing before or at the hearing or orally at the hearing. The court may also grant a continuance on its own motion. (2) If the court grants a continuance, any temporary restraining order that has been granted shall remain in effect until the end of the continued hearing, unless otherwise ordered by the court. In granting a continuance, the court may modify or terminate a temporary restraining order. (r) (1) If a respondent, named in a restraining order issued under this section after a hearing, has not been served personally with the order but has received actual notice of the existence and substance of the order through personal appearance i [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]