ICBM Act

I 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 2227 To extend the life of the Minuteman III and redirect savings from develop- ment of the new ground-based strategic deterrent program toward the development of a universal coronavirus vaccine, and for other purposes. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MARCH 26, 2021 Mr. KHANNA (for himself, Mr. MCGOVERN, Mr. POCAN, Mr. HUFFMAN, Ms. LEE of California, Ms. JAYAPAL, Mr. BLUMENAUER, Mr. COHEN, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. GARCI´A of Illinois, Ms. JACKSON LEE, Ms. PRESSLEY, Ms. OMAR, and Ms. NORTON) introduced the following bill; which was re- ferred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Com- mittee on Appropriations, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall with- in the jurisdiction of the committee concerned A BILL To extend the life of the Minuteman III and redirect savings from development of the new ground-based strategic de- terrent program toward the development of a universal coronavirus vaccine, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 1 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Investing in Cures Be- 4 fore Missiles Act of 2021’’ or the ‘‘ICBM Act’’. 5 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:59 May 27, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2227.IH H2227 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 2 •HR 2227 IH SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 1 Congress finds the following: 2 (1) According to the Congressional Budget Of- 3 fice, the projected cost to sustain and modernize the 4 United States nuclear arsenal, as of 2017, ‘‘is $1.2 5 trillion in 2017 dollars over the 2017–2046 period: 6 more than $800 billion to operate and sustain (that 7 is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear forces and about 8 $400 billion to modernize them’’. With inflation, the 9 cost rises to $1,700,000,000,000 and does not in- 10 clude the cost of the additional nuclear capabilities 11 proposed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. 12 (2) The Government Accountability Office 13 found in July 2020 that the Department of Defense 14 and the National Nuclear Security Administration 15 have still not taken meaningful steps to address af- 16 fordability concerns or heeded the Government Ac- 17 countability Office’s recommendation to consider 18 ‘‘deferring the start of or cancelling specific mod- 19 ernization programs’’, including the W87–1 warhead 20 modification program, to address increases in the 21 weapons activities budget requests of the National 22 Nuclear Security Administration. 23 (3) The ground-based strategic deterrent pro- 24 gram is expected to cost between $93,100,000,000 25 and $95,800,000, which does not include the cost of 26 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:59 May 27, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2227.IH H2227 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 3 •HR 2227 IH the W87–1 warhead modification program or the 1 cost to produce new plutonium pits for the warhead. 2 The total estimated life cycle cost of the ground- 3 based strategic deterrent program is 4 $264,000,000,000, and the program is intended to 5 replace 400 deployed Minuteman III missiles with 6 more than 600 new missiles, to allow for test flights 7 and spares. 8 (4) The Air Force awarded a sole-source con- 9 tract to Northrop Grumman for the engineering and 10 manufacturing component of the ground-based stra- 11 tegic deterrent program in September 2020, raising 12 concerns that the absence of competition for the 13 award may result in higher than projected costs to 14 United States taxpayers. 15 (5) The National Nuclear Security Administra- 16 tion is also in the early stages of developing a re- 17 placement intercontinental ballistic missile warhead, 18 the W87–1, and expanding plutonium pit production 19 to build new warhead cores, costing at least 20 $12,000,000,000 and $9,000,000,000, respectively, 21 to meet the modernization needs of the ground-based 22 strategic deterrent program. 23 (6) Maintaining and updating the current Min- 24 uteman III missiles is possible for multiple decades 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:59 May 27, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2227.IH H2227 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 4 •HR 2227 IH and, according to the Congressional Budget Office, 1 through 2036 this would cost $37,000,000,000 less 2 in 2017 dollars than developing and deploying the 3 ground-based strategic deterrent program. 4 (7) A public opinion poll conducted from Octo- 5 ber 12 to 28, 2020, by ReThink Media and the Fed- 6 eration of American Scientists found that only 26 7 percent of registered voters in the United States pre- 8 ferred replacing the Minuteman III intercontinental 9 ballistic missile with the ground-based strategic de- 10 terrent, as compared to 60 percent of registered vot- 11 ers who opposed replacing the Minuteman III mis- 12 sile. 13 (8) On April 3, 2019, Lieutenant General Rich- 14 ard M. Clark, then-Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff 15 for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, 16 noted in testimony before the Committee on Armed 17 Services of the House of Representatives that we 18 have ‘‘one more opportunity’’ to conduct life exten- 19 sion on the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 20 missile, indicating the technical feasibility of extend- 21 ing the Minuteman III missile despite his stated 22 preference for the ground-based strategic deterrent. 23 (9) Even in the absence of an intercontinental 24 ballistic missile leg of the triad, the 2018 Nuclear 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:59 May 27, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2227.IH H2227 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 5 •HR 2227 IH Posture Review signaled that the United States 1 would have an assured retaliatory capability in the 2 form of several ballistic missile submarines, which 3 are, ‘‘at present, virtually undetectable, and there 4 are no known, near-term credible threats to the sur- 5 vivability of the [ballistic missile submarine] force’’, 6 a benefit that will be enhanced as the Department 7 of Defense moves to replace the Ohio class ballistic 8 submarine fleet with the new Columbia class ballistic 9 missile fleet. 10 (10) While intercontinental ballistic missiles 11 had historically been the most responsive leg of the 12 United States nuclear triad, advances in ballistic 13 missile submarine communications to allow for the 14 dissemination of emergency action messages in war- 15 time have negated that advantage. 16 (11) Intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot be 17 recalled, leaving decision-makers with mere minutes 18 to decide whether to launch the missiles before they 19 are destroyed, known as a posture of ‘‘launch on 20 warning’’ or ‘‘launch under attack’’ in the face of a 21 perceived nuclear attack, greatly increasing the risk 22 of a national leader initiating a nuclear war by mis- 23 take. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:59 May 27, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2227.IH H2227 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 6 •HR 2227 IH (12) In 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a former lieu- 1 tenant colonel of the Soviet Air Defense Forces cor- 2 rectly identified a false warning in an early warning 3 system that showed several United States incoming 4 nuclear missiles, preventing Soviet leaders from 5 launching a retaliatory response, earning Colonel 6 Petrov the nickname ‘‘the man who saved the 7 world’’. 8 (13) Former Secretary of Defense William 9 Perry, who once briefed President Bill Clinton on a 10 suspected Russian first nuclear strike, wrote that 11 the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad is ‘‘desta- 12 bilizing because it invites an attack’’ and interconti- 13 nental ballistic missiles are ‘‘some of the most dan- 14 gerous weapons in the world’’ and ‘‘could even trig- 15 ger an accidental nuclear war’’. 16 (14) General James Cartwright, former vice 17 chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Com- 18 mander of the United States Strategic Command, 19 wrote, with Secretary Perry, ‘‘[T]he greatest danger 20 is not a Russian bolt but a US blunder—that we 21 might accidentally stumble into nuclear war. As we 22 make decisions about which weapons to buy, we 23 should use this simple rule: If a nuclear weapon in- 24 creases the risk of accidental war and is not needed 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:59 May 27, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2227.IH H2227 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 7 •HR 2227 IH to deter an intentional attack, we should not build 1 it. . . . Certain nuclear weapons, such as . . . the 2 [intercontinental ballistic missile], carry higher risks 3 of accidental war that, fortunately, we no longer 4 need to bear. We are safer without these expensive 5 weapons, and it would be foolish to replace them.’’. 6 (15) General George Lee Butler, the former 7 Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command 8 and subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the United 9 States Strategic Command, said, ‘‘I would have re- 10 moved land-based missiles from our arsenal a long 11 time ago. I’d be happy to put that mission on the 12 submarines. So, with a significant fraction of bomb- 13 ers having a nuclear weapons capability that can be 14 restored to alert very quickly, and with even a small 15 component of Trident submarines—with all those 16 missiles and all those warheads on patrol—it’s hard 17 to imagine we couldn’t get by.’’. 18 (16) While a sudden ‘‘bolt from the blue’’ first 19 strike from a near-peer nuclear adversary is a highly 20 unlikely scenario, extending the Minuteman III 21 would maintain the purported role of the interconti- 22 nental ballistic missile leg of the triad to absorb such 23 an attack. 24 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:59 May 27, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2227.IH H2227 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 8 •HR 2227 IH SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON EXTENSION OF LIFE- 1 SPAN OF MINUTEMAN III AND DEVELOPING A 2 VACCINE OF MASS PREVENTION. 3 It is the policy of the United States that— 4 (1) the operational life of the Minuteman III 5 missiles can be safely extended until at least 2050; 6 and 7 (2) investments in developing a universal 8 coronavirus vaccine and efforts to save lives from 9 other types of infectious diseases are a better use of 10 United States taxpayer resources than building a 11 new and unnecessary intercontinental ballistic mis- 12 sile. 13 SEC. 4. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR VACCINES INSTEAD 14 OF MISSILES. 15 (a) TRANSFER FROM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.— 16 Of the unobligated balances of appropriations made avail- 17 able for the Department of Defense for the research, de- 18 velopment, test, and evaluation of the ground-based stra- 19 tegic deterrent program, the Secretary of Defense shall 20 transfer $1,000,000,000 to the National Institute of Al- 21 lergy and Infectious Diseases to conduct or support com- 22 prehensive research for the development of a universal 23 coronavirus vaccine. 24 (b) TRANSFER FROM NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY 25 ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of Energy shall trans- 26 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:59 May 27, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2227.IH H2227 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 9 •HR 2227 IH fer all unobligated balances of appropriations made avail- 1 able for the National Nuclear Security Administration for 2 the W87–1 warhead modification program to the Centers 3 for Disease Control and Prevention to research and com- 4 bat emerging and zoonotic infectious diseases. 5 SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR GROUND- 6 BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT PROGRAM 7 AND W87–1 WARHEAD MODIFICATION PRO- 8 GRAM. 9 None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or 10 otherwise made available for fiscal year 2022 may be obli- 11 gated or expended for the ground-based strategic deter- 12 rent program or the W87–1 warhead modification pro- 13 gram. 14 SEC. 6. INDEPENDENT STUDY ON EXTENSION OF MINUTE- 15 MAN III INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MIS- 16 SILES. 17 (a) INDEPENDENT STUDY.—Not later than 30 days 18 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 19 of Defense shall seek to enter into a contract with the Na- 20 tional Academy of Sciences to conduct a study on extend- 21 ing the life of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 22 missiles to 2050. 23 (b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The study under sub- 24 section (a) shall include the following: 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:59 May 27, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2227.IH H2227 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 10 •HR 2227 IH (1) A comparison of the costs through 2050 1 of— 2 (A) extending the life of Minuteman III 3 intercontinental ballistic missiles; and 4 (B) deploying the ground-based strategic 5 deterrent program. 6 (2) An analysis of opportunities to incorporate 7 technologies into the Minuteman III intercontinental 8 ballistic missile program as part of a service life ex- 9 tension program that could also be incorporated in 10 the future ground-based strategic deterrent pro- 11 gram, including, at a minimum, opportunities to in- 12 crease the resilience against adversary missile de- 13 fenses. 14 (3) An analysis of the benefits and risks of in- 15 corporating sensors and nondestructive testing meth- 16 ods and technologies to reduce destructive testing re- 17 quirements and increase the service life and number 18 of Minuteman III missiles through 2050. 19 (4) An analysis and validation of the methods 20 used to estimate the operational service life of Min- 21 uteman II and Minuteman III motors, taking into 22 account the test and launch experience of motors re- 23 tired after the operational service life of such motors 24 in the rocket systems launch program. 25 VerDate Sep 11 2014 00:59 May 27, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2227.IH H2227 pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS 11 •HR 2227 IH (5) An analysis of the risks and benefits of al- 1 ternative methods of estimating the operational serv- 2 ice life of Minuteman III motors, such as those 3 methods based on fundamental physical and chem- 4 ical processes and nondestructive measurements of 5 individual motor properties. 6 (6) An analysis of risks, benefits, and costs of 7 configuring a Trident II D5 submarine launched 8 ballistic missile for deployment in a Minuteman III 9 silo. 10 (7) An analysis of the impacts of the estimated 11 service life of the Minuteman III force associated 12 with decreasing the deployed intercontinental bal- 13 listic missiles delivery vehicle force from 400 to 300. 14 (8) An assessment on the degree to which the 15 Columbia class ballistic missile submarines will pos- 16 sess features that will [Text truncated for display. Full text available on Congress.gov.]